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Philosophy and Theology

Given the increasing desire for life-saving transplantation, proposals aim ing
to bridge the gap betw een supply and dem and o f donated organs continue to be
circulated. “The greatly enhanced technical ability to transplant organs has also led
to an ever-increasing need for transplantable organs. The explosive grow th in the
dem and for and the m arginal increase in the supply o f transplantable organs have
together been characterized as an ‘evolving national health care crisis.’” 1 In the
U nited States alone, approxim ately one hundred thousand patients are on transplant
waiting lists, but each year only ten to tw enty thousand receive organs (Thom as
D. H arter, “Overcom ing the Organ Shortage: Failing M eans and Radical Reform,”
H E C Forum , June 2008).
One way in w hich this gap could be narrow ed is by m aking m ore use o f organ
donation after cardiac death (DCD). “M any patients in the intensive care unit will
die o f these very same neurological diagnoses but never satisfy criteria for brain
stem death. It is by utilizing this new population o f potential donors that N H B D
[non-heart-beating-donation] m ay substantially increase the organ donor pool.” 12
M. D. Bell estim ates that the organ pool could be increased by 25 percent through
DCD, a possibility w hich generates considerable pressure to increase DCD.3As J. L.
Verheijde, M. Y. Rady, and J. M cG regor note, a “federal m andate requires hospitals
as o f January 2007 to design policies and procedures for organ procurem ent in DCD

1J. L. Verheijde, M. Y. Rady, and J. McGregor, “Recovery of Transplantable Organs
after Cardiac or Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigm for the Ethics of Organ
Donation,” Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine 2.8 (May 2007): 1.
2D. Gardiner and B. Riley, “Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation: Solution or a Step
Too Far?” Anaesthesia 62.5 (May 2007): 431.
3See M. D. Bell, “Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation: Old Procurement Strategy—
New Ethical Problems,” Journal o f Medical Ethics 29.3 (June 2003): 177.
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to increase the rate o f organ donation and recovery from decedents to 75 percent
or greater.” 4
C oncerns about w hether neurological criteria can properly define death also
drive interest in D C D as an alternative to transplantation following brain death
(see D. A lan Shewmon, “B rain Death: Can It Be R esuscitated?” H astings Center
Report, M arch-A pril 2009). The early years o f organ transplantation m ade use o f
cardiopulm onary criteria in determ ining death. Following the 1968 H arvard M edi
cal School Ad H oc C om m ittee report, death began to be defined in term s o f loss o f
brain function, either whole brain or even just higher-brain function. Even though
in current practice the m ajority o f transplantation com es from donors declared dead
by the use o f neurological criteria, organ donation still takes place through the ap 
plication o f cardiopulm onary (circulatory-respiratory) criteria in determ ining death.
However, i f we are to retain the dead-donor rule and i f the critics o f brain death are
correct, then the use o f circulatory-respiratory criteria to determ ine death becom es
not ju st a possibility but a necessity for organ donation purposes. (For a critique o f
brain-death criteria, see F ranklin G. M iller and R obert D. Truog, “The Incoherence
o f D eterm ining D eath by Neurological Criteria: A C om m entary on Controversies in
the D eterm ination o f Death, a W hite Paper by the President’s Council on Bioethics,”
K ennedy Institute o f Ethics Journal, June 2009.)
Unfortunately, three sorts o f ethical questions have been raised about DCD
itself. First, is there a necessary conflict o f interest betw een providing optim al care
for the patient donating organs and looking to benefit the organ recipient? Second,
is it perm issible to alter care for the donor prior to death solely for the sake o f the
organ recipient or are such interventions in violation o f the m axim always to respect
hum anity as an end in itself and never use any person simply as a m eans? Third, at
w hat point can we declare death by m eans o f circulatory-respiratory criteria?
The first question is w hether there is a necessary conflict o f interest in DCD
betw een providing the best care for the organ donor and looking after the interests
o f the organ recipient. The potential for conflict is certainly possible, since a physi
cian m ay neglect to properly care for, or even kill, one patient in order to get viable
organs for another patient. Transplantation practices in Sweden m ay provide a
m odel for resolving potential conflicts o f interest. (See K. Z eiler et al., “The Ethics
o f N on-H eart-Beating Donation: How N ew Technology Can Change the Ethical
Landscape,” Jo u rnal o f M edical Ethics, July 2008.)5 In Sweden, m edical profes
sionals are strictly forbidden from asking about or discussing the donor status o f a
patient (whether pro or con) during the course o f treatm ent. A fter death is declared,
the health care team checks the national registry for advance directives to find out
w hether the patient consented to organ donation. This way o f proceeding avoids

4Verheijde, Rady, and McGregor, “Recovery of Transplantable Organs,” 2.
5In the Swedish approach, the individual decision whether or not to be an organ donor
takes precedence, but in cases in which there is no directive either for or against donation,
the presumption is that the person would consent to organ donation and donation is done
unless the family objects.
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conflicts betw een providing the best care for the dying patient and looking to secure
organs for needy organ recipients. Since the donor status o f a patient is unknow n
prior to death, physicians and others have no incentive to provide less than optim al
care for donors. A physician in such a case simply does not know w hether the patient
is a potential organ donor, so considerations about benefiting a potential recipient
cannot cloud the physician’s judgm ent.
A second question relevant for DCD concerns antem ortem interventions. In
the case o f antem ortem interventions, the patient is still alive but is given treatm ents
in order to prepare his organs for transplantation to benefit the organ recipient. Is
it ethically perm issible to perform procedures on the donor w hile the donor is still
alive solely for the sake o f the organ recipient? Such inventions are possible only in
controlled DCD, for in uncontrolled cases o f DCD the patient has already died. The
ethical concern w ith antem ortem interventions is that it is m orally w rong for one
person (the donor) to be used simply as a m eans to aid another person (the organ
recipient). DCD would seem to violate the widely held m axim that hum anity, w hether
in one’s ow n person or in another, is always to be respected as an end in itself and
never used simply as a means. I f DCD is perm itted, basic treatm ent needed to sustain
life m ay be w ithdraw n, simply to secure m ore organs.6 N ancy Valko suggests that
the patients m ay be pressured into “pulling the plug” so as to m ake them selves u se 
ful as sources o f organ donation. There is an apparent conflict betw een im plem ent
ing the Swedish protocol ju st described and doing any antem ortem interventions
whatsoever. However, i f we m odify the Swedish Transplantation A ct to say that no
inquiry m ay be m ade into donor status until the patient has died or the patient has
decided to remove life-sustaining treatm ent, this difficulty is avoided, as are Valko’s
concerns o f Valko. However, in cultural contexts such as our own, in w hich the basic
hum an dignity o f all hum an beings is frequently denied, this concern— that DCD
dehum anizes patients in their final hours— are serious.
These concerns are am plified by the views o f some (but not all) advocates o f
DCD. For example, Jam es F. Childress considers such people “better o ff dead than
alive w ith severe pain and discom fort.”7 C hildress’s view is undifferentiated. Severe
pain and discom fort are evils— evils that exist only in living beings. However, it
does not follow from this that life itself is evil, or th at people in severe pain would
be better o ff dead. Life is an intrinsic good, because bodily life is a constitutive
elem ent o f w hat it is to be a hum an being, and to be a hum an being is always good.
Similarly, knowledge o f a painful truth causes suffering and hardship, but it does not
follow that people would be “better o ff w ithout intelligence” or that intelligence itself
is som etim es an evil, even though it is true that in elim inating hum an intelligence
certain kinds o f suffering would thereby also elim inated. H um an life is good, it is not

6See Nancy Valko, “Ethical Implications of Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation,”
Human Life Review 28.3 (Fall 2002): 109.
Jam es F. Childress, “Non-Heart-Beating Donors of Organs: Are the Distinctions
between Direct and Indirect Effects and between Killing and Letting Die Relevant and
Helpful?” Kennedy Institute o f Ethics Journal 3.2 (June 1993): 204.
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an evil or not w orth living, even though hum an life is a necessary condition for pain
and suffering, and even though in some cases the burdens o f some life-sustaining
treatm ent outweigh its benefits.
C hildress wonders w hether a patient m ay tu rn down treatm ent in order to aid
an organ recipient. “One unresolved question is w hether altruistic patients who w ant
to increase the chances that their deaths w ill produce usable organs m ay choose to
alter the care provided in the last few hours o f their lives.” 8 However, in m edical
practice, a com petent patient m ay always to refuse m edical treatm ents. Therefore, if
a com petent patient chooses to discontinue or refuse a treatm ent that in the patient’s
view w as not w orthwhile, in order to help an organ recipient, this is not prim a facie
legally or ethically problematic. To refuse continued life-sustaining treatm ent is not
m orally w rong so long as it is not chosen precisely as a m eans to suicide.
Zeiler and colleagues argue that a patient should be treated only for his or her
own sake; therefore the use o f anticoagulants and other drugs for the sake o f the
person receiving the donation is prohibited. However, presum ing inform ed consent,
neither forgoing treatm ent judged burdensom e by the patient nor taking on bodily
risks for the sake o f benefiting someone else violates the K antian m axim o f respecting
all persons, including oneself, as ends in them selves and never using them simply
as a means. In the case o f kidney donation, for example, the donor freely chooses to
undergo risks o f various kinds— including surgery and future reliance on a single
kidney— in order to aid another person, yet because this sacrifice for the good o f
another is freely chosen, it em bodies rather than underm ines innate hum an dignity.
Using a person simply as a m eans treats the hum an person as a m ere tool or biological
m aterial to be m anipulated, but in giving free consent the donor acts as an autono
m ous person. O f course, not every autonom ously chosen action is compatible w ith
proper self-regard. For example, suicide com m itted to provide organs for another is
m orally im perm issible, for it is m aking use o f oneself simply as a m eans as i f every
innocent hum an life were not inviolable. However, risking one’s ow n well-being
to help another is heroically generous. By contrast, com m iting suicide in order to
give non-duplicate vital organs to another violates the principle that every innocent
person, including oneself, should not be intentionally killed.
B ut perhaps precisely this principle can be used to argue against antem ortem
interventions in DCD cases. I f one m ay not intentionally kill or hasten death, even
to aid another person, then i f DCD necessarily involved either, it would be wrong.
In uncontrolled cases o f DCD, these issues are not relevant, since it is impossible
to kill, or hasten the death of, an already dead patient. However, in controlled DCD
cases, one could argue that removal o f life support is intentional killing or intentional
hastening o f death.
The removal o f life support m ay indeed, in some cases, violate the sanctity o f
life, but it need not in all cases be intentional killing. I f the removal o f life support
is simply the m eans chosen to kill the patient, it w ould indeed be w rong and simply
a form o f euthanasia. However, if the life-supporting treatm ent is rem oved because

8Ibid., 210.
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the treatm ent, not the patient, is judged m ore burdensom e than beneficial, then such
removal is moral. Rem oval o f life support in such cases does not involve a hom icidal
intent, even i f it is certain the patient w ill die. I f rem oving life support even in cases
where death w ill certainly follow can be perm issible, how m uch m ore is the adm in
istration o f antem ortem interventions, w hich m ay only risk hastening death perm is
sible. Typical antem ortem interventions in DCD cases include the adm inistration o f
heparin or phentolam ine, and cannulation. I could find no conclusive evidence that
these interventions necessarily hasten death in potential non-heart-beating donors.
However, m any authors point to the risks o f such interventions, perhaps even lethal
risks.9
A ssum ing that antem ortem interventions risk death, they m ay still be justified
by double-effect reasoning. First, it is not intrinsically evil to do an action that risks
death, including fighting fires, serving in the m ilitary, or taking a potentially lethal
m edication to preserve life or health. Second, if death com es about, the death in the
DCD case is not a m eans to the end o f helping the organ recipient, since the hastened
death is not w hat m akes the organs suitable for transplantation. True, the patient
m ust be dead i f the dead-donor rule is to be respected, but the tim ing o f the death
is not norm ally essential to the organ donation. In other w ords, i f the organ donor
dies a few m inutes sooner rather than a later, this tim ing o f death is not a m eans to
the organ donation but a side-effect o f preparing the organs for donation. Third, the
evil o f hastened death is not intended as either a m eans or an end in itself. In other
words, the physician is not necessarily seeking, endeavoring, or w illing the early
death o f the patient so as to facilitate organ transplantation. Again, the tim ing o f the
death o f the donor is not relevant for successful organ transplantation. Finally, there
exists a serious reason for allowing the possible evil effect, namely, saving the life
o f the organ recipient.
Steinberg objects that “the principle o f double effect can be m anipulated because
the notion o f w hat it intended is both malleable and subject to the w him s o f hum an
consciousness. The same act m ay be perm issible or im perm issible depending on
w hat enters a physician’s consciousness.” 10*In other words, double-effect reasoning
leads to ethical doublethink, in w hich w hat is wrong is m ade right simply by pow er
o f mind.
Steinberg’s objection does not adequately capture double-effect reasoning
properly understood.11 I f an agent literally is unaw are o f an aspect o f an action, if
this effect is not at all a p art o f the agent’s plan or even consciousness, then the agent

9See Bell, “Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation,” 179; and David Steinberg, “The
Antemortem Use of Heparin in Non-Heartbeating Organ Transplantation: A Justification
Based on the Paradigm of Altruism “ Journal o f Clinical Ethics 14.1-2 (Spring-Summer
2003): 19.
10Steinberg, “Antemortem Use of Heparin,” 20.
“ Perhaps the best single resource for this understanding is Thomas Cavanaugh,
Double-Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006).
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is ignorant o f th at effect. Ignorance, o f course, com es in tw o varieties— culpable
and inculpable. I f the agent is inculpably ignorant o f an evil effect, then no moral
guilt is incurred and the action as perform ed by the agent is not m orally defined by
th at effect. I f the agent is culpably ignorant, then the agent is ethically responsible
for w hat occurs, for the agent could have and should have been aware o f the effect.
However, w hat is intended or not intended does not shift simply as a result o f one’s
m ental focus. W hat is know ingly chosen as a m eans to an end or as an end in itself
is always intended— regardless o f w hat narrative the agent constructs to somehow
transform a m eans into a side-effect, regardless o f w hich effects the agent was
“focusing” on in consciousness, regardless o f w hether the agent regrets or delights in
the given effect. W hat an agent intends corresponds to the actual m eans and actual
ends chosen as a part o f agent’s practical reasoning.
A third question facing controlled DCD is, w hen does irreversible loss o f car
diopulm onary function take place? No single, universally accepted standard exists
for the determ ination o f death by cardiac criteria. Patients are declared dead in less
than tw o m inutes o f asystole (cardiac standstill) in m any intensive care units. The
Pittsburgh protocol for DCD insists on tw o m inutes; the Institute o f M edicine five
m inutes, and the M aastricht protocol ten m inutes. The forem ost critic o f brain death,
D. A lan Shewmon, believes th at norm ally the “point o f no return” is tw enty to th irty
m inutes following loss o f circulation.12
I f we adopt the m ost dem anding standard, tw enty to th irty m inutes, then we
have greater assurance o f not violating the dead-donor rule. Adopting this standard
m ay also increase the likelihood o f public confidence th at transplantation itself does
not kill donors, a perception that m ay increase the num ber o f people w ho are w illing
to be donors. By contrast, less dem anding standards m ay increase public perception
th at organ transplantation kills one person to aid another, driving down the num ber
o f w illing donors and further exacerbating the organ shortage.
Is the dem anding standard o f tw enty to th irty m inutes com patible w ith retriev
ing viable organs for donation? DCD m ost often involves the donation o f kidneys and
livers.13 Fortunately, these organs rem ain viable for donation, “up to forty m inutes
after cessation o f heartbeat. (Kidneys and livers are more resilient to oxygen depriva
tion than other organs).” 14 DCD can also be used for lung transplantation: “The gas
exchange system o f the lungs can tolerate one hour o f w arm ischem ia after circulatory
arrest w ithout significant loss o f functional capacity.” 15 W hat about DCD for heart

12See D. Alan Shewmon, “Brainstem Death, Brain Death, and Death: A Critical
Re-Evaluation,” Issues in Law & Medicine 14.2 (Fall 1998).
13See Roger Herdman, Thomas L. Beauchamp, and John T. Potts, “The Institute of
Medicine’s Report on Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation,” Kennedy Institute o f
Ethics Journal 8.1 (March 1998): 86.
14Phyllis L. Grasser, “Donation after Cardiac Death: Major Ethical Issues,” National
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7.3 (Autumn 2007): 541.
15Axel Carlberg, “Transplanting Lungs from Non-Heart-Beating Donors,” National
Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2.3 (Autumn 2002): 378.
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transplantation? “Recently the Papworth hospital group described the first case o f
functional recovery in a hum an deceased donor heart following in-vivo perfusion o f
the coronary circulation w ith norm otherm ic blood using an extracorporeal circuit.
A fter tw enty-three m inutes o f w arm ischem ia the asystolic heart was perfused and
reverted into sinus rhythm .” 16 Even w ith the dem anding standard, livers, kidneys,
lungs, and perhaps even hearts can be retrieved in cases o f DCD.
This raises a problem , for i f kidneys, livers, lungs, and m aybe also hearts are
all still viable for transplantation after tw enty to th irty m inutes o f asystole, then the
patient would seem to be still alive. In taking the patient’s vital organs, we violate the
dead-donor rule. However, i f we w ait until an hour or tw o passes, then the patient is
certainly dead but the organs com m only retrieved in DCD are not longer viable.
This is a false dilem m a. The fact that an organ or even m any organs m ay
function well in a donor’s body does not m ean th at the organ donor is not yet dead.
Life consists not in having various organs that can function outside the context o f
the organism , but rather in the integrated functioning o f the organism as a whole.
Im agine a special disintegrating m achine that destroyed every cell in the hum an
body except for the liver, lungs, heart, and kidneys. A hum an being disintegrated
in such m anner is obviously dead, but the organs are nevertheless viable. In a less
im aginative example, a hum an being is no longer alive shortly following decapita
tion, but the organs o f such a person m ay very well rem ain viable for transplantation.
Organic life consists not in possessing organs that can function in other contexts,
but rather in being an organism w ith integrally functioning organs.
In this essay, I have attem pted to briefly answ er three m ain ethical questions
arising from DCD. These include concerns about a conflict o f interest betw een
providing the best treatm ent for potential donors and facilitating organ transplanta
tion, w orries about the use o f antem ortem drugs to facilitate organ transplantation,
and uncertainties about determ ining death by m eans o f cardiopulm onary criteria.
These reasonable concerns should give pause to advocates o f DCD, but the ethical
difficulties appear to be surm ountable. Properly carried out, DCD is, in m y view,
ethically perm issible even i f it rem ains from a m edical point o f view technically
difficult to successfully perform .
C hristopher K aczor , P h .D.
Loyola M arym ount U niversity
Los Angeles, C alifornia

16Ashley Laboratory, “Deceased Donor as a Source for Organs for Heart Transplanta
tion” (2009), Stanford University School of Medicine, http://ashleylab.stanford.edu/projects/
physclin/non_heart_beat_donor.html.
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